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Evolving Group Strategies for IPD
Philip Hingston, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— The Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) is often
used to model cooperation between self-interested agents. In
an earlier study, we introduced a framework using IPD to
study the effects of species-level competition on the evolution
of cooperative behaviour. In this paper, we extend the previous
work, using co-evolutionary simulations of interactions between
species of IPD-playing agents to investigate how group strategies
may evolve. We find that the ability to cooperate more with
agents of the same species greatly increases the ferocity of
competition between species.

I. I NTRODUCTION
An important question in biology is how cooperative
behavior can evolve in a population of selfish organisms. This
question has long been studied using computers to simulate
the evolution of agents playing the iterated prisoners dilemma
(IPD), beginning, perhaps in 1981 with [1]. IPD is a model
that encapsulates the choices an organism faces regarding
whether or not to cooperate with another organism, and the
payoffs resulting from the choices the two organisms jointly
make.
Many hundreds of papers on the topic have examined
it from many directions the effect of miscommunication,
spatial models, multiple levels of cooperation, multiple players, choice of partners, signaling, selection schemes and so
on. But in all these variations, the evolutionary process has
been studied at the level of changing proportions of different
alleles in a population of players – “microevolution”. In an
earlier paper ([9]), we proposed a framework for studying the
evolution of cooperation at the level of competition between
species, sometimes called “macroevolution”, which includes
phenomena such as speciation, mutualism (cooperation between species), parallel evolution, extinction and so on. In
that paper we showed that group strategies can perform well
in IPD, but we left open the question of how such strategies
might evolve. This paper is a first step in answering that
question.
In the rest of this paper, we first briefly introduce the
iterated prisoners dilemma and the idea of group-aware
strategies for playing it. We then review a simulation framework for simulating species-level evolution of IPD playing
agents. In the following two sections, we describe and discuss
experiments using this framework to study some scenarios
with 0-order and first order group-aware strategies. We
conclude with some suggestions for further work on evolving
group-aware strategies.
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II. BACKGROUND AND R ELATED W ORK
The Prisoners Dilemma (PD) is an abstract game used
to study human and natural systems in which cooperation
between self-interested individuals is observed or desired. It
was introduced by Flood and Dresher in the early 1950s in
studies applying game theory to global nuclear strategies [2].
It has also been applied to problems in psychology [3],
economics [4], politics [5], and biology [6].
As PD is widely known, we describe it briefly here, and
refer the reader to [7] for a more detailed description. In
a game of PD, two players simultaneously choose one of
two possible moves, C (cooperate) or D (defect). If both
players choose C, they each get a payoff of R (reward). If one
chooses C and one chooses D, the cooperator gets S (sucker)
while the defector gets T (temptation). If both defect, they
get P (punishment). For this work, we chose the common
values T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, and S = 0. Defecting is the
dominant strategy for PD (i.e. it is the best choice regardless
of the opponent’s choice). Thus two rational players will
defect on each other, each getting a payoff of P. This is
the dilemma, for if the players could somehow manage to
cooperate, each would be better off, getting a payoff of R.
Cooperation becomes viable when players play sequences
of rounds of PD against each other, i.e. when they play
the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD). To prevent players
anticipating the last move in a game, the sequence continues
with some fixed probability (the discount factor).
In IPD, player strategies are rules that determine a players
next move following any possible sequence of previous
moves. For example, TitForTat is this strategy : cooperate
on the first move, and play the opponents previous move
after that. Each players aim is to maximize his total payoff
over the series of moves.
A. IPD Tournaments
Interest in IPD has been greatly enhanced over the years
by IPD tournaments or competitions. Around 1980, Robert
Axelrod staged two round-robin tournaments between computer programs designed by participants to play IPD. Many
sophisticated programs were submitted. In each case, the
winner was Anil Rapaport’s submission, a program that simply played TitForTat. In 1987, Axelrod carried out computer
simulations using a genetic algorithm to evolve populations
of strategies playing the IPD against each other [1]. In
these simulations, TitForTat-like strategies often arose, but
other, more complicated strategies sometimes evolved that
outperformed TitForTat in particular populations. Axelrod
used this to illustrate that there is no “best” strategy for
playing the IPD in such an evolving population, because

success depends on the mix of other strategies present in
the population.
In 2004 at the IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, a set of competitions was run to celebrate the 20th
anniversary of Axelrod’s 1984 book on the subject [10].
Competitors were allowed to enter more than one strategy,
and some took advantage of this to enter group strategies
– strategies in which players colluded with each other in
order to improve the chances of one of their number winning
the competition. The competitions were repeated at the
2005 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and
Games (CIG05), along with an extra competition in which
group strategies were not allowed. Many of the successful
competitors described their entries in [7].
B. Group-aware strategies for IPD
Motivated partly by the success of the colluding strategies
in the 2004 and 2005 competitions, in [9], we introduced a
framework for studying how species could evolve the capacity to cooperate. In that initial work, we explored interactions
between species of agents playing different fixed strategies
some of which were group-aware – agents played differently
depending on the species of their opponent. It was found that
the dynamics of a multi-species co-evolutionary model are
different from those of the traditional single-species model,
and that in that context, even simple group-aware strategies
can sometime outcompete more sophisticated group-unaware
strategies. For example, the very simple Clique strategy
(cooperate with your own species, defect on everyone else)
can perform better than TitForTat. This is different from
other studies such as [8], where cliques form within a single
species, and individuals can refuse to interact with others not
in their clique - a microevolutionary phenomenon.
This paper extends the work begun in [9], by allowing
species to evolve their strategies while competing with each
other. Thus, while the earlier study focussed on how certain
fixed strategies interact with each other, it did not address
the question of how such strategies could evolve in the first
place.
Prior to [9], existing evolutionary simulations involving
IPD operated at the level of evolving alleles in a single
species population. There had also been earlier research
involving the use of evolutionary simulatons at the species
level (for example, [11], [12], [13]), but not for IPD.
III. F RAMEWORK
We explore the question of how group-aware IPD strategies may evolve using co-evolutionary simulations of evolving populations with several species of IPD playing agents.
Specifically, we extended the framework introduced in [9],
by allowing the agents to play differently depending on
which species their current opponent belongs to. The ground
rules are the same as in [9], namely:
• We simulate a population of IPD playing agents;
• The population consists of agents belonging to a number
of distinct species;
• Each species has its own specific kind of genome;

Agents reproduce asexually, with the child’s genes derived from its parent’s by mutation - the child is the
same species as its parent;
• An agent’s genes determine the strategy the agent uses
when playing IPD;
• An agent’s fitness is determined as the average payoff
it receives from playing IPD games against the rest of
the population;
• An agent’s reproductive success is proportional to its
fitness.
We implemented this framework in Java, representing
agents with the class Organism:
•

public class Organism
{
public Genotype genotype;
public Phenotype phenotype;
public double fitness;
}
Thus, each organism has a genotype (peculiar to its
species). The genotype determines the phenotype of the
organism, which in this case embodies the strategy that the
organism uses when playing IPD, and the fitness value is
determined by the accumulated payoffs recieved by the organism using that strategy. In our Java realisation, Genotype
is an interface:
public interface Genotype
{
public Genotype copy();
public void mutate();
public Phenotype develop();
}
The intention of these methods is that:
copy() is used during “reproduction” to make a clone of a
genotype.
mutate() is used to simulate mutation of the genome during
reproduction and should modify the caller. And
develop() is used to simulate morphogenesis by creating a
phenotype based on the information in the genotype.
The Phenotype interface is as shown below:
public interface Phenotype
{
public Move getFirstMove(
Class opponentClass);
public Move getNextMove(
Class opponentClass,
Move oppLastMove);
}
, where
getFirstMove() is used to determine the player’s first move
in a game against a new opponent. The class of the opponent
is provided to facilitate collusion.

getNextMove() is used to determine a subsequent move by
the player. The current opponent’s previous move is passed,
and it is up to the player to remember his own previous
move, and the history of previous moves if desired. Again,
the class of the opponent is provided to facilitate collusion.
Note that we chose to provide the agents with the species
of their opponent (in our implementation, the class of their
opponent’s Genotype). An alternative would have been to
require agents to infer the species of their opponent solely
from their moves during a game of IPD. For example, some
of the successful group-aware entries in the 2005 CEC and
CIG IPD competitions used the first few moves in a game to
recognise fellow conspirators. Because the technicalities of
this kind of signalling are not our focus here, we decided to
make the task of recognising friends and allies explicit and
straightforward.
A species of IPD player is specified, in this framework,
by a pair of Java classes implementing the Genotype and
Phenotype interfaces. In our experiments, we simulate coevolutionary competition between various sets of species,
using a procedure described by the pseudo-code below:
1. Create initial population of Organisms
2. While not done do
3.
For each pair of Organisms O1 and O2
4.
Play O1 against O2 in a game of IPD
5.
O1.fitness += O1’s average payoff
6.
O2.fitness += O2’s average payoff
7.
Start a new population
8.
While new population not complete
9.
Select a parent O
10.
C = O.genotype.copy()
11.
C.mutate()
12.
P = C.develop()
13.
Add a new Organism(C, P, 0.0)
to the population
14.
End While
15. End While

We start, as described in the next section, with the simplest
group-aware strategies we could think of, and progress to
more complex strategies in the following section.
IV. 0- ORDER STRATEGIES
To establish a baseline for later experiments, we first
consider species playing pure 0-order strategies. Although
the framework allows for a strategy to specify different
moves for players of any number of different species, for
simplicity, we will only consider strategies that specify one
move for players of ones own species, and one move for
players of other species. Additionally, we restrict attention
to strategies that play the same first and subsequent moves.
Thus, there are four pure 0-order strategies to consider - let’s
call them C-C (cooperate with everyone), C-D (cooperate
with our own species, defect against others), D-C (defect
against our own species, cooperate with others) and D-D
(defect against everyone). It is easy to see that D-D is the
dominant strategy.

What happens in an evolutionary setting if an individual
tries to cooperate? If any sort of cooperation is possible, the
most promising idea seems to be to cooperate with fellow
species members, and defect against the rest. Imagine then
two species, A and B in competition, both playing D-D,
and consider a mutant individual in species A, who plays
C-D. Compared to D-D, this mutant suffers a penalty of 1
whenever he plays another member of A. However, every
other member of A gets a benefit of 4. Therefore there is
a nett benefit to species A. Unfortunately, the genes that
produce this benefit will be selected against, as selection
acts on the individual rather than the species as a whole!
(Aside: in the 2005 CEC and CIG IPD competitions, the
successful colluding entries used a kind of extreme version
of this strategy, where everyone in the group played C-D
except for one player, who played D-D. This worked well
as the competition, unlike evolution, was one in which it
was only important to have one very successful individual in
the colluding group – the fate of the rest of the group was
irrelevant.)
Hence, we have a new kind of dilemma: if a species could
evolve to play C-D more often than a competing species
playing D-D, it would have an evolutionary advantage (it
would have a higher average fitness), but evolution acts
against any mutation in that direction.
As a further illustration, imagine that species A somehow
became full of C-D players, and consider a mutant D-D
player. Now the mutant gets a benefit of 2 every time he
plays another member of A (5 instead of 3) while the species
as a whole loses out because everyone else pays a penalty
of 3 (0 instead of 3). Thus the mutation will spread within
A (and the average fitness of A will decrease). A population
of C-D players is an unstable configuration.
Given the analysis above, is there any way for a species
to evolve whose members cooperate with each other, but
defect against others? Looking for mixed strategies doesn’t
help – the same arguments seem to apply to any mutation
that increases cooperation. We will see though that, as in
the case of IPD without group-aware strategies, reasonable
levels of cooperation can evolve if the players use higher
order strategies (see Section V).
But before we leave this discussion on 0-order strategies,
we present some simulation results that support our analysis.
A. Two species 0-order simulations
To verify our expectations about 0-order strategies, we
created two species, Group-aware 0-order Species 1 (GA0-1)
and , Group-aware 0-order Species 2 (GA0-2). These species
are identical, except that individuals can be recognised as one
species or the other. The genome is a pair of symbols, each
either C or D. Possible genotypes are C-C, C-D, D-C and
D-D, which are interpreted as above. Mutation switches each
symbol with some fixed probability.
For the first simulations with these species, we began
with a population of 50 GA0-1 and 50 GA0-2 players, each
with randomly generated genotypes, and with a mutation
probability of 0.05 per symbol (i.e. a 1 in 20 chance). We ran
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Fig. 1. Evolution of one species in a simulation with two identical species of
GA0 players. Each species starts with 50 randomly generated genotypes, and
the mutation rate is 5%. After a few generations, the amount of cooperation
(self and other) fluctuates between 0 and 20%, with mean about 5%. The
top figure shows a typical run, while the bottom figure shows mean values
over 20 runs.

Fig. 2. Evolution of one species in a simulation with two identical species
of GA0 players, with different mutation probabilities. The figure shows the
species with the higher mutation probability (5%) - the other species has a
mutation probability of 1%. As before, each species starts with 50 randomly
generated genotypes, the top figure shows a typical run, while the bottom
figure shows mean values over 20 runs.

the simulations for 1000 generations. The top plot in figure 1
shows the results of a typical simulation. In the figure,
we show one of the species. Both species evolve towards
minimal cooperation, with the residual cooperation being
maintained by mutation. After an initial settling period of a
few generations, the populations of the two species fluctuate
around 50%, and the amount of cooperation varies between
about 0 and 20%. The mean population for the species
shown after generation 50 is 49.8, the mean proportion of
cooperation when playing members of the same species is
5.86%, and when playing members of the other species
is 5.23%. The other species is similar, with mean selfcooperation of 5.94% and other-cooperation of 5.37%. The
bottom plot in the figure shows average values over 20 runs.
Mean values over the 20 runs were: population = 49.98, selfcooperation = 5.49% and other-cooperation = 5.63%.
As an additional test, we ran further simulations with GA01 and GA0-2, this time giving them different mutation rates.
We saw in the first simulation that the mean proportion of

cooperation is similar to the mutation probablity. This is
approximately the case for other mutation rates also. What
if, say, GA0-1 has a mutation probability of 5%, while GA02 has a mutation probability of 1%. In this case, a priori,
we might expect GA0-1 to exhibit more cooperation than
GA0-2. We have seen that the self-cooperation component
of this should benefit the cooperator’s brethren, even though
harming the cooperator himself. What will the nett effect be?
Figure 2 shows results from a typical run and mean results
over 20 runs, as in Figure 1. In the single run, the mean
population for GA0-1 is 40, with mean self-cooperation
of 6.89% and mean other-cooperation of 4.49%. This is
confirmed by the averages over 20 runs: mean population
is 37.64, mean self-cooperation is 6.78% and mean othercooperation is 4.4%. For GA0-2, mean self-cooperation is
0.86% and mean other-cooperation is 1.37%.
This simulation shows that it is possible for a species to
evolve preferential cooperation within a species (i.e. greater
cooperation within the species than with individuals from

V. 1- ORDER STRATEGIES
In this section, we examine pure first-order strategies, i.e.
those where the agent’s move in the current round of an IPD
game depends on the moves made in the previous round. An
example of such a strategy in the standard version of IPD
is tit-for-tat, in which the agent plays whatever move was
played by his opponent in the previous round. In our version
of IPD, a 1-order strategy must specify what move the agent
plays depending on the species of his opponent as well as
on the previous moves. Once again, we restrict attention to
strategies that only differentiate between agents of ones own
species, and agents of other species. Therefore, they can be
specified as a pair of 1-order strategies for standard IPD —
one that is used when playing against an opponent of the
same species, and one that is used when playing against
others. As there are 32 pure 1-order strategies for standard
IPD, we are looking at 32 × 32 strategies. These can be
denoted by two sequences of 5 C’d or D’s. For example,
CCDCD-CCDCD denotes the strategy of playing tit-for-tat
against everyone. The first 5 symbols specify the first move,
the move following a round where the agent played C and the
opponent played D (CD), the move following DC, the move
following CD, and the move following DD, when playing
against one’s own species, and the last 5 specify how to play
against an opponent from another species.
In a similar way as for 0-order strategies, we created two
species, GA1-1 and GA1-2, which are identical except that
it is possible to tell which species an individual belongs
to. Possible genotypes for both species are specified by two
sequences as described above. When a mutation occurs, one
of the 10 symbols is randomly selected to be switched.
1) One species 1-order simulations: First, we repeated
an often-seen experiment by simulating a population of 100
agents of species GA1-1. The mutation probability was set
to 0.05. Since there is only one species, only the first part of
the genome is relevant, and the simulation is one where the
agents are playing standard IPD. Figure 3 shows a sample
of 5 runs, and the usual pattern of initial defection followed
by cooperation is seen. (In contrast, although we have not
presented any one species 0-order simulations, cooperation
never evolves in those simulations.) What will change when
we introduce a second species?
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Fig. 3. Five sample runs with a single species of 1-order group-aware
agents. As there is no other species, only the part of the strategy that
determines play within the species is relevant, and we see the classic pattern
of initial defection, followed by domination by cooperative strategies. The
time taken to establish cooperation varies between about 15 generations and
35 generations.

2) Two species 1-order simulations: We now move on
to the case of two species using first order strategies. We
carry out two experiments. In the first, both species ignore
the species of the opponent. The setup for the second is
identical, except that both species are group-aware.
Two species 1-order but not group-aware
For this experiment, we created two new identical species,
UGA1-1 and UGA1-2. The genome for these species is one
half of the genome for the species GA1-x, specifying an
initial move, and first order responses, ignoring the species
of the opponent.
We started each simulation with 50 UGA1-1 and 50UGA12 agents, and ran for 1000 generations. We repeated the
simulation 10 times. In each simulation, one species or the
other eventually gains and maintains a numerical advantage
over the other. In 5 out of 10 cases, the less successful species
actually went extinct.
As in the previous experiment, both species initially defect
but quickly evolve cooperation. The simulation then becomes
a kind of random walk, in which the luckier species becomes
more numerous. Figure 4 shows mean values of self- and
other-cooperation for both species (whichall follow a similar
path on average), and the mean number of agents in the
more numerous of the two species (which we might call the
“winner” of the run).
Two species 1-order group-aware
This experiment is like the previous one, except that
the agents are group-aware : we started each simulation
with 50 GA1-1 and 50 GA1-2 agents, all with randomly
generated genomes. The result was a surprise : in almost
every simulation, one species or the other went extinct before
the 200th generation.
Figure 5 shows mean values as in Figure 4. As before,
initially, both species tend towards defection. By about the

VI. C ONCLUSION AND F UTURE W ORK
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Fig. 4. Means for 10 runs with two species of 1-order group-unaware
agents. The bold black line is the proportion of the population in the species
that became more numerous (the ‘winner’). The solid red line shows the
proportion of self-cooperation for the winner, while the dotted red line
shows the proportion of cooperating moves with agents of the other species.
Similarly, the blue lines show the same proportions for the loser in the run.
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In these experiments, we have extended our earlier work
on species level evolution of cooperation by allowing the
evolution of strategies that explicitly play differently against
different species of player. We found that this can significantly alter the dynamics of evolution — in this case,
intensifying inter-species competition.
With these examples, we have shown that the proposed
framework is suitable for examining group effects in applications modelled using IPD. For example, in economics,
individual agents might represent companies and species
might represent the countries in which they are based. Would
we expect that companies would develop a tendancy to favour
other companies based in the same country in their business
dealings? Would this be likely to be a successful strategy?
Similar questions could be asked concerning, say academics
(agents) and their interactions with each other in a university,
be they in the same of different departments. The general
question : can a group as a whole, and/or individuals in a
group, gain an advantage by cooperatiing differentially with
other individuals depending on the group they belong to?
In all our examples to date, agents only distinguish between their own species and other species. It would be
straightforward to examine coalitions of, say, two species,
acting against a third. Would there be any advantage to be
gained in this way? Elaborations of the basic model might
be used to explore some of the same IPD variations that have
been proposed and studied previously, such as the effects of
noise, different levels of cooperation, reputation, and so on.
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Fig. 5. Means for 10 runs with two species of 1-order group-aware agents.
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10 generations point, both species start to cooperate more.
It seems that the species that is more numerous by this
point is able to evolve towards self-cooperation slightly faster
than the less numerous one, and from that time onwards
accelerates away, so that by about 40 generations, it accounts
for 90% of the population and attains a self-cooperation of
about 80%, and about 70% cooperation with members of the
other species. The less successful species never gets above
about 60% self-cooperation, and drops to about 10 − 20%
before finally succumbing.
Thus we see that in this scenario, competition between
species is so intense that one species or the other is quickly
driven to extinction.
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